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Has the Chevron' doctrine really affected the way that adminis-
trative lawyers think, how courts decide cases and how agencies be-
have? As recent as 1991, a co-author and I described Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. ("Chevron") as
merely a "significant but subtle change in legal doctrine."2 In his
oral presentation at this symposium, Professor Peter Shane was
* Professor (adjunct) of Law, Yale Law School and Georgetown University
Law Center; Partner, Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP, Washington, D.C. Professor
Elliott was General Counsel of EPA during the first Bush administration,
1989-1991.
1. Chevron, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45
(1984) (deferring to agency interpretation of its governing statute when Congress
fails to explicitly express its intent). Of course, no case stands alone. There were
precursors to Chevron including Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
421 U.S. 60 (1975), and Chevron would have had no meaning. if it had not been
followed in subsequent cases. Any case is both an epiphenomenon and a partial
cause of what comes later. An opinion, particularly a Supreme Court opinion,
represents and exemplifies underlying trends in the law, but also by reifying these
trends in a particular text, it becomes a causal factor influencing subsequent devel-
opments. Unless the context indicates otherwise, references to Chevron through-
out this article should be understood to refer to what is sometimes called "the
Chevron doctrine," the legal principles for defining deference in statutory construc-
tions between courts and agencies, as stated in Chevron and refined in subsequent
cases. See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987); United States v. Mead
Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001). It would be a fine topic for an article to address how
the legal tests stated in the Chevron case differ from those in other cases, both
before and after. In fact, many such articles have already been written. That is not
the topic of this article, which is concerned instead with how the Chevron doctrine
as a whole has affected the relationships of courts and agencies, particularly in the
environmental area.
2. Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical
Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DuKE L.J. 984, 1026 (1991) (analyzing sta-
tistical data that offered support for proposition that Chevron caused subtle change
in statutory interpretation and administrative law).
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even more skeptical, speculating that Chevron merely changed the
verbal formulas courts used, and implying that Chevron had little
actual effect on judicial decisions. 3 Both of these views are wrong.
They may be plausible interpretations of Chevron based on the text
in isolation, but they describe a road not taken by legal history as
events actually developed. In retrospect, Chevron signified a funda-
mental paradigm-shift4 that redefined the roles of courts and agen-
cies when construing statutes over which agencies have been given
interpretive rights. 5
Admittedly, Chevron is not the only trend that occurred in stat-
utory construction over the last three decades. There has also been
a pronounced rise in textualism, 6 perhaps fueled at least in part
by the first step of the Chevron analysis. 7 Nevertheless, the Chevron
doctrine changed the balance of power between courts and agen-
cies.8 This in turn led to more policy initiatives by executive agen-
cies, especially in the environmental area. Moreover, Chevron also
changed the internal dynamics inside executive agencies by altering
the relationships between officials within these agencies. In partic-
ular, Chevron reduced the relative power of lawyers within agencies
and strengthened the voices of officials in other disciplines.
3. Peter M. Shane, Ambiguity and Policy Making: A Cognitive Approach to Synthe-
sizing Chevron and Mead, 16 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. - (Spring 2005).
4. Cf THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIc REVOLUTIONS (2d ed.
1970) (discussing paradigm shifts in context of scientific revolutions, where anom-
aly disproves currently held scientific theory, resulting in new scientific theory, or
paradigm shift, that accounts for anomaly).
5. Chevron, 467 U.S. 842-47 (implementing new theory of judicial review for
interpreting agency's interpretation of its governing statute). Not every interpreta-
tion of a statute by an agency warrants Chevron deference. See, e.g., FDA v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Co., 529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000). "We are confident that Con-
gress could not have intended to delegate a decision of such economic and politi-
cal significance [as regulating tobacco] to an agency in so cryptic a fashion." Id.
"We have recognized a very good indicator of delegation meriting Chevron treat-
ment in express congressional authorizations to engage in the process of rulemak-
ing or adjudication that produces regulations or rulings for which deference is
claimed." See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001).
6. See, e.g., MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Amer. Telephone and Tele-
graph Co., 512 U.S. 218, 224-34 (1994) (using textualist canons of statutory con-
struction); Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72
WASH. U. L.Q. 351 (1994) (discussing rise of textualism).
7. See Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J.
969, 977 (1992) (analogizing Chevron deference to "on/off switch").
8. See Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L.
REv. 2071, 2085-88 (1990) (explaining how Chevron changed relations between
courts and agencies with regard to agency action and agency's interpretation of its
governing statute).
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I. THE EFFECTS OF CHEVRON ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW.
"[W]hether an opinion becomes precedent depends on
whether otherjudges cite it," writesJan Deutsch. 9 According to this
standard, Chevron is an important, even "notorious," precedent.10 It
is oft-cited and provides a useful and convenient "test" for judges
and lawyers because it created a simple roadmap for analyzing the
complex mysteries of how courts should defer to administrative
agencies when construing statutes. Chevron is not merely a useful
citation, rhetorical resource or codification, but instead is an im-
portant paradigm-shifting case that re-conceptualized the relative
roles of courts and agencies when construing statutes over which
agencies have been given interpretive rights.
In the environmental area, the United States Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") and other agencies gradually internal-
ized and adapted to the additional interpretive discretion (i.e., the
expanded power) that Chevron provided them.11 Accordingly, EPA
and other agencies are now more adventurous when interpreting
and elaborating statutory law. 12 In what follows, I will describe in
greater detail how Chevron changed EPA's internal dynamics. At
the outset, one example illustrates my basic thesis that Chevron mat-
ters. After Congress failed in 2003 and 2004 to enact the Bush Ad-
ministration's Clear Skies 13 initiative designed to reduce air
pollution via nationwide trading systems, EPA recently proposed a
rule to implement pollution trading systems over most of the coun-
try under existing law.14 Before Chevron, EPA would not even imag-
ine that it possessed the authority to work such fundamental
reforms into a major statutory scheme without the benefit of statu-
tory amendment.
9. Jan Deutsch, Law as Metaphor: A Structural Analysis of Legal Process, 66 GEO.
L.J. 1339, 1346 (1978) (discussing that case is only influential when it is used by
lawyers and cited by judges).
10. PETER L. STRAUSS, ET AL., GELLHORN AND BYSE'S ADMrNISTRATVE LAw:
CASES AND COMMENTS 1032 (revised 10th ed., 2003) (noting Chevron's notoriety in
administrative law).
11. See Linda Cohen & Matthew Spitzer, Solving the Chevron Puzzle, 57 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 67-68 (Spring 1994) (offering insightful prediction that remand
rates would equilibrate as agencies became more aggressive in interpreting law
under Chevron).
12. See id. (offering insightful prediction that remand rates would equilibrate
as agencies became more aggressive in interpreting law under Chevron).
13. See The Clear Skies Act of 2003, available at http://www.epa.gov/
ebtpages/airairpoclearskies.html (last modified Nov. 13, 2004) (setting forth Clear
Skies Act).
14. Proposed Rule To Reduce Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter
and Ozone (Interstate Air Quality Rule), 69 Fed. Reg. 4566 (proposed January 30,
2004).
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Thus, Chevron and its progeny created a fundamental change
in the rules of the power struggle between the courts and executive
agencies. Prior to Chevron, the lower federal courts primarily held
the power to determine "what the law is" when a statute was un-
clear. Post-Chevron, a substantial portion of that power shifted from
the judiciary to the Executive Branch.
Not only does Chevron shift this power from the Judicial Branch
to the Executive Branch, but the nature of the power to interpret
ambiguous or silent statutes also has become more significant by
virtue of moving into the hands of the Executive Branch. 15 The
federal circuit courts that handle most administrative law cases 16
are inherently decentralized and, therefore, generally lack the abil-
ity to uniformly agree upon and implement new directions in policy
or policy reforms. 17 Although courts can block or dampen policy
initiatives and perhaps even insist that agencies address certain fac-
tors, they can only rarely and with great difficulty create new policy
directions or trends on their own, at least in environmental law.
On the other hand, the centralized Executive Branch is more likely
to be guided by a more coherent political will or ideology. As such,
it is better able to define and implement new policy over time. For
instance, it is more capable of creating and effectuating a goal to
make regulation more cost effective through the expanded use of
risk assessment and benefit-cost analysis, or to expand environmen-
tal trading programs.
In Chevron, the Supreme Court reformed the law-making sys-
tem by moving a substantial portion of the power to construe stat-
utes to the Executive Branch. Chevron rendered the legal system
more adaptable and more capable of undergoing substantial policy
changes without the benefit of legislation. One might even specu-
late that the increased ability of the law-making system to adapt to
new conditions without legislation may in turn help to account for
15. SeeJonathan T. Molot, TheJudicial Perspective in the Administrative State: Rec-
onciling Modern Doctrines of Deference with the Judiciary's Structural Role, 53 STAN. L.
REv. 1, 76 (2000) (criticizing Chevron majority for not stating more clearly that its
"Two-Step" applied to both statutory ambiguities and silences). To be clear, Chev-
ron applies both to statutory ambiguity and to statutory silence. Id.
16. See generally Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Ffty Cases Per Year: Some Implica-
tions of the Supreme Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87
COLUM. L. REv. 1093, 1105-06, 1119-20 (1987) (explaining that mostjudicial review
of agency action must take place at mid-level appellate courts due to practical con-
straints on Supreme Court, and is, therefore, decentralized).
17. SeeJERRY L. MAsHAw, ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAw: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC
LAw SYsTEM, CASES AND MATERIALS 799-800 (4th ed., 1998) (stating that judicial
scrutiny is "intermittent" and "the ultimate effects of judicial review [are] quite
unpredictable at the time of decision.").
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the relative paucity of significant environmental legislation since
1990.18 Historically, most environmental legislation followed in the
wake of a crisis, 19 but legislation is less necessary today because of
the Executive Branch's post-Chevron powers to update and adapt ex-
isting legislation to meet emerging problems. 20
Thus, Chevron marked a significant way-station in the evolution
of the so-called "Administrative State."21 Chevron remains a signifi-
cant milestone in our evolving constitutional structure because it
has given more policy discretion and law-making authority to ad-
ministrative agencies, most of which are a part of the Executive
Branch.22 This trend is a gradual, but fundamental, change in the
nature of American government without the benefit of a constitu-
tional amendment. 23
In the following section, I describe in more depth the changes
that Chevron wrought and explain how they have affected environ-
18. See 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399
(1990) (signaling last major reworking of an environmental statute in United
States). Since 1990, there has been some noteworthy environmental legislation of
interstitial or amendatory quality, including the Safe Drinking Water Act Amend-
ments of 1996 and the Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, but there has been
nothing like the period of statutory creativity that characterized environmental law
in the 1970s and 1980s.
19. See E. Donald Elliott, et al., Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Feder-
alization of Environmental Law, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313, 318-19 (1985) (observing
that most major environmental legislation follows environmental crisis).
20. See generally Ruth Harlow, The EPA and Biotechnology Regulation: Coping with
Scientific Uncertainty, 95 YALE L.J. 553 (1986) (noting how United States could and
did use Chevron to modify existing statutes rather than try to get new statute en-
acted). For example, rather than pass a new statute to regulate biotechnology (as
did many other countries), through administrative interpretation of an existing
statute, the United States adapted a statute passed to deal with chemicals to the
quite different risks presented by biotechnology. Id.
21. See generally B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIvE LAW 149 (2d ed., 1984) (offer-
ing view on "Administrative State"). The term "Administrative State" is often used
but rarely defined. It appears to mean the rise of administrative agencies to
greater power and prominence in our governmental structure. For example, Pro-
fessor Bernard Schwartz observed that during the 1970s the "center of gravity" of
government policy-making - not just administrative law, but the entire American
government - shifted into the notice-and-comment rule-making process. Id.
22. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political
Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 93-94 (1985) (noting that Chevron had effect of
putting more legislative policy-making discretion in hands of agencies, and thus
Executive Branch).
23. For differing views on whether these fundamental changes in the struc-
ture of the American government are good or bad, compare Bruce Ackerman, The
Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013 (1984) (positing that,
normatively, shared policy-making discretion throughout the Executive and Legis-
lative Branches is favorable) with DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSI-
Bi=. How CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION (1993)
(pointing out dangers in different branches of government sharing legislative pol-
icy-making discretion).
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mental law. I will begin with a discussion of empirical evidence that
elucidates Chevron's effects. Then, I will touch upon my own experi-
ence with Chevron as General Counsel of EPA. Finally, I will offer a
normative perspective on Chevron's effects on Administrative Law.
II. How CHEVRON CHANGED ADMINISTRATIVE LAw.
In the 1960s and 1970s, courts reviewing agency action were
typically quite aggressive in reviewing "questions of law." How a
court should interpret an agency's governing statute was a prototyp-
ical question of law for the court.2 4 To be sure, courts gave some
deference to an agency's views for a variety of peripheral reasons;
for example, agency personnel may have been involved in drafting
the statute.25 But fundamentally, determining a statute's meaning
was a "question of law," and, echoing Chief Justice John Marshall in
Marbury v. Madison, it was for the courts to say what the law is.26
Chevron changed this, at least when an agency's interpretation of its
governing statute was at issue.
Chevron fundamentally re-conceptualized the relationship be-
tween courts and agencies by adopting a standard of review
whereby courts, instead of reviewing statutory ambiguities strictly de
novo, frequently deferred to an agency's interpretation of its gov-
erning statute. There are two independent steps to this standard of
review, which is commonly referred to as the Chevron Two-Step:
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the stat-
ute which it administers, it is confronted with two ques-
tions. First, always, is the question whether Congress has
spoken directly to the precise question at issue. If the in-
tent of Congres is clear, that is the end of the matter; for
the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however,
the court determines Congress has not directly addressed
the precise question at issue, the court does not simply im-
pose its own construction on the statute, as would be nec-
24. See Louis L. JAFFE, JuDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATiVE ACrTION 589, 590
(1965) (construing courts as guarantors of "coherence" in the law). See, e.g., McK-
art v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 201-02 (1969) (stating that parties need not
exhaust administrative remedies on pure questions of law because those are for
court to decide).
25. See Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965) (noting one reason courts
deferred to agency interpretations prior to Chevron).
26. See Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L.
REv. 1, 2 (1983) (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803)) (pointing out
that courts considered themselves ultimate interpreters of law).
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essary in the absence of an administrative interpretation.
Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to
the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the
agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of
the statute.27
In the first step, the Chevron court held that if Congress had de-
cided "the precise question at issue," its decision was binding, but
the Chevron court also stated that Congress sometimes fails to antici-
pate every question that may arise under a statute and may not ex-
press an intention as to what a statute means with respect to those
unanticipated questions.2 8 This first step is breath-taking in its im-
plications. Courts used to conceive of a statute as a package of in-
structions that, once decoded, will answer every conceivable
question that might arise. In Chevron, however, the Court adopted
the far more realistic view that most members of Congress probably
never even think about many questions that might arise subse-
quently under a statute they enact, much less form a consensus on
them. This first move in Chevron rejected the prior legal fiction that
Congress had an imminent, if unconscious, "intention" on every
conceivable question that might arise and that it was the role of
courts to "find" Congress' intentions on every question when inter-
preting a statute. This first step was part and parcel of a broader
trend by the Supreme Court in the 1980s to (1) invalidate the idea
that individual members of Congress could make binding law by
legislative history or other individual actions, 29 and (2) to instead
insist that binding law can be made by the legislature only if it fol-
lows the formal process for passing a statute: approval by a majority
of both houses, subject to veto by the President. 30
In the second step, the Chevron court held that if Congress did
not make a decision on the exact question at issue, the default rule
is that Congress has implicitly delegated the authority to fill in the
27. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-45 (setting forth Chevron Two-Step).
28. Id. (noting that Congress may not always anticipate every scenario to
which statute could conceivably apply, and, therefore, statute may be ambiguous as
to those unanticipated scenarios).
29. Brock v. Pierce County, 476 U.S. 253, 263 (1986) (stating that floor state-
ments by individual legislators may be considered but are not controlling). See also
Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing Stat-
utes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. Rv. 277
(1990) (identifying and disapproving of trend by Supreme Court to give legislative
history less binding weight than in past).
30. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 946-59 (1983) (explaining that Congress
must comply with presentment and bicameralism procedures to pass laws).
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statutory gaps to the relevant agency.31 This gave agencies signifi-
cant new interpretive and policy-making power because now they,
not the courts of appeals, made policy in the gaps left by Congress' silence.
One interesting question that the Chevron opinion did not an-
swer is where this rule of implied delegation comes from?3 2 Is the
rule constitutionally-based? Is it merely a rebuttable presumption
that can be overturned by Congress? We are not told in Chevron,
for the Court merely asserted as an: ipse dixit, without justification,
that if Congress has not resolved a particular question when enact-
ing a statute, then it is for the agency to resolve that question. 33
Subsequent cases have clarified that only statutes directing an
administrative agency to execute the statute's provisions are those
that grant an implied delegation of Chevron deference to that
agency.34 Assuming that Congress has not "spoken to the issue" in
question in a statute, i.e., it has made no conscious policy decision
as to a particular issue (the so-called Chevron Step One inquiry),
and assuming a statute implicitly grants interpretive authority to an
agency, that agency's interpretation of the statute must be upheld if
it is "reasonable. '3 5 This second step of the Chevron Two-Step is
subject only to the weak judicial check that the agency's decision
must be "reasonable," a standard that applies anyway to virtually all
aspects of administrative decisions that are subject to judicial re-
view. On a few occasions, courts have found that an agency's inter-
pretation fails the Chevron Step Two test of reasonableness, but such
outcomes are rare, particularly in the Supreme Court. 36
A. External Evidence that Chevron Matters.
My colleague and friend, Professor Peter Shane, had a valid
point perhaps that as an a priori analysis of legal prose, the Chevron
Two-Step might have had little effect on subsequent cases and ad-
ministrative law generally. There is only one problem with the
31. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-45 (setting forth the deference courts should give
agencies when statute is "silent" or ambiguous).
32. See Sunstein, supra note 10, at 2085-91 (questioning origin of Chevron's
"implied delegation" language).
33. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-45 (stating that agency should "fill" gaps Congress
left, intentionally or unintentionally, in statute).
34. See supra note 7 and accompanying text for an explanation of when Chev-
ron applies.
35. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, 865-66 (stating that court should defer to agency
interpretation of gap or ambiguity in statute so long as agency interpretation is
reasonable and is "permissible construction" of statute).
36. See, e.g., AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Util. Bd., 529 U.S. 366 (1999) (declining to
defer to some FCC interpretations because they failed reasonableness standard).
[Vol. XVI: p. I
CHEVRON MATrERS
Shane hypothesis: it is not true empirically. "The life of the law has
not been logic; it has been experience," as then-professor Oliver
Wendell HolmesJr. reminds us. 37 In fact, Chevron has been a highly
significant decision and the opinion manifests38 a broader trend in
the law that changed behavior quite significantly both inside agen-
cies and in the power relationships between agencies and courts.
I observed these changes both as an academic and as a partici-
pant. Just before I was appointed EPA General Counsel in 1989, my
colleague at Yale, Peter Schuck, and I completed a three-year em-
pirical study that examined whether Chevron actually affected the
patterns of subsequent cases and the degree of deference that re-
viewing courts gave to agency decisions. In 1991, Duke Law Journal
published the results of that study in an article called To the Chevron
Station.39 "A central goal of our study was to determine whether...
the Chevron decision... actually affect[ed] the subsequent behavior
of lower courts in reviewing administrative decisions."40 We studied
a six-month period of time prior to Chevron and a six-month period
of time after the Supreme Court clarified and reiterated the Chev-
ron doctrine in INS v. Cardozo-Fonseca4l to ascertain whether there
was any difference in the pattern of appellate results that occurred
in those two periods. What we found was quite striking. We found
a statistically significant increase in the level of deference the courts
were paying to agency decisions. In other words, the pattern of
courts affirming agency decisions went from approximately 71% to
approximately 81%, and this change is highly statistically significant
because of the large number of cases considered.42 We also found
37. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 5 (Little, Brown ed.,
1881).
38. Of course, no case stands alone. There were precursors to Chevron, and
Chevron would have had no meaning if it had not been followed in subsequent
cases. Any case is both an epiphenomenon that represents and exemplifies under-
lying trends in the law. By reifying these trends, a case becomes a causal factor in
the subsequent development of the law. For my views on these and related juris-
prudential issues, See generally E. Donald Elliott, Holmes and Evolution: Legal Process
as Artificial Intelligence, 13J. LEGAL STUD. 113 (1984). Unless the context indicates
otherwise, references to Chevron throughout this article should be understood to
refer to what is sometimes called "the Chevron doctrine," the legal principles for
defining deference between courts and agencies, as stated in Chevron and refined
in subsequent cases. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
39. See Schuck & Elliott, supra note 3, at 996-1007, 1026 (publishing results of
Schuck and Elliot's three year empirical study).
40. Id. at 1026 (stating purpose of study).
41. See generally 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (holding that immigration judge and
Board of Immigration Affairs erred in applying wrong standard of proof; they
should have applied Chevron).
42. Schuck & Elliott, supra note 3, at 1038-41 (setting forth empirical
findings).
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and controlled for a variation of what we call a "reasons displace-
ment effect. '43 This is the hypothesis that agencies might change
the grounds on which they base their decisions because of the inter-
pretive power received from Chevron.44 We also found that agencies
changed the basis for their decisions on a statistically significant
level. Since our study, a number of other empirical studies con-
firmed the effects of Chevron on the relationships between courts
and agencies.45 So, while it is plausible to hypothesize that Chevron
did not have a significant effect, when one actually looks at the
data, one can plainly see that Chevron did have a measurable and
significant effect on the degree of deference that courts give to
agency constructions of statutes.
Some have criticized our study for not explicitly considering
and ruling out factors that might have accounted for the changed
pattern of results we observed.46 We did, however, consider and
rule out many potential explanations, such as the changing mem-
bership and political composition of the lower courts. Although I
do agree with the critics that, in retrospect, our published study
should have addressed this issue in more depth, the external evi-
dence is nevertheless clear that Chevron matters. Chevron did in fact
tilt the power balance between courts and agencies in the direction
of greater deference to agency interpretations of statutes.
43. Id. at 1043 (describing "reasons displacement effect" in agency context).
44. Id. (explaining that date indicates that Chevron also caused agencies to
begin changing grounds on which they based their decisions, in addition to
courts).
45. See generally Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: An Empirical Study on
the Chevron Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 15 YALEJ. ON REG. 1 (1998) (offer-
ing empirical data that supports hypothesis that Chevron had significant effect on
judicial review of agency interpretations); Richard Revesz, Environmental Regulation,
Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REv. 1717 (1997) (offering empirical data
that supports hypothesis that Chevron had significant effect on judicial review of
agency interpretations); Christopher H. Schroeder & Robert L. Glicksman, State
Farm and EPA in the Courts of Appeals During the 1990s, 31 ENVrL. L. REP. 10,371
(April, 2001) (offering empirical data that supports hypothesis that Chevron had
significant effect on judicial review of agency interpretations).
46. Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHi. L. REV. 1, 36-37
(2002).
Schuck and Elliot, relying on quantitative evidence, report that the per-
centage of administrative agency decisions that appellate courts affirmed
in 1984 (that is, prior to Chevron) was 70.9; after Chevron, that figure rose
to 81.3. Does this necessarily mean that Chevron caused an increase.., in
judicial deference to agencies? Of course not. It is possible that the in-
crease (decrease) would have occurred (or, perhaps would have been
greater) in the absence of Chevron.
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B. Testimony that Chevron Matters Inside Agencies.
Chevron's importance is also demonstrated by the change it
caused in the dynamics inside agencies. When I was appointed EPA
General Counsel in 1989, most of the lawyers I worked with were
still doing business the old way, imposing their views of the "best
interpretation" of the statute on the program offices based on statu-
tory wording and legislative history. As General Counsel, I tried to
redefine the way the General Counsel's Office ("OGC") functioned
within EPA by incorporating the paradigm shift brought about by
the Chevron decision. I gave up trying to explain Chevron to the
other lawyers in the OGC and concluded that they just would not
believe it from me, wild-eyed academic from Yale that I was. So I
brought in Pat Wald, then chief judge of the D.C. Circuit, and Cass
Sunstein from the University of Chicago, to speak at an all-lawyers'
meeting. They spoke to the lawyers in the OGC about Chevron, and
the lawyers finally began to believe that Chevron really did change
things. From that point on, as a result of Chevron, we started to
change the way that we did business.
The fundamental difference between the role of EPA OGC
(and probably in any other agency as well) pre-Chevron and post-
Chevron is this: pre-Chevron, OGC usually gave its legal advice as a
point estimate, e.g., "the statute means this. There is only one
meaning to the statute. We in OGC are the keepers of what the
statute means. The statute speaks to every question, and you must
follow what we in OGC tell you is the correct/best interpretation of
the statute or you will lose in court." In other words, the pre-Chev-
ron conception of a statute was as a prescriptive text having a single
meaning, discoverable by specialized legal training and tools. This
"single-meaning" conception of statutes created a very powerful
role for lawyers and OGC within agencies. The privileged role for
lawyers in defining what the statute required on every issue in turn
led to a great deal of implicit policy-making by lawyers in OGC.
They may have in all good faith believed that they were divining the
one true and correct meaning of the statute, but intentionally or
unintentionally, they may have smuggled a great deal of their policy
preferences into their legal advice. As EPA's General Counsel, I
tried to get our lawyers to separate their legal opinions from their
policy advice and to differentiate between the two.
Post-Chevron, the form of OGC opinions is no longer a simple
point estimate of what a statute means. Rather, OGC opinions now
attempt to describe a permissible range of agency policy-making
discretion that arises out of a statutory ambiguity. Post-Chevron, stat-
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utes no longer possess a single prescriptive meaning on many ques-
tions; rather, they describe what I call a "policy space," a range of
permissible interpretive discretion, within which a variety of deci-
sions that the agency might make would be legally defensible to
varying degrees. So the task of OGC today is to define the bounda-
ries of legal defensibility, and thereby to recognize that often there
is more than one possible interpretation of the meaning of key stat-
utory terms and concepts. The agency's policy-makers, not its law-
yers, should decide which of several different but legally defensible
interpretations to adopt.
Chevron opened up and validated a policy-making dialogue
within agencies about what interpretation the agency should adopt
for policy reasons, rather than what interpretation the agency must
adopt for legal reasons. I believe that this expanded policy dia-
logue is productive and that it takes place more inside EPA today
than it did pre-Chevron, and normatively, that is a good thing. For
example, it is good that Chevron has increased the weight given to the
views of air pollution experts in the air program office relative to the
lawyers in OGC.
A second effect of the Chevron decision is somewhat more sub-
tile. Post-Chevron, lawyers in an agency often have to say that the
right answer to a question of agency authority is not "you can or
cannot do it," but rather that "it depends." That legal advice usu-
ally provokes a rejoinder: "And what does it depend on?" Because
of the nature of the "Chevron deference" that courts now give to
agencies, the answer is usually that whether an agency's interpreta-
tion of its authority will be upheld depends on how strong its rea-
sons are; it depends on what justifications the agency would be able
to give for a policy. In other words, whether a court will uphold an
agency's interpretation of its authority depends on contingent, con-
sequentialistjustifications. It depends on what one can write into a
preamble justifying an interpretation in terms of factual support
and policy justifications.
This refocusing of the dialogue inside the agency to the conse-
quences of adopting particular policies is also an extremely good
thing. By refocusing the question of legal authority on the strength
of an agency's justification for a proposed policy, Chevron displaces
the dialogue about whether something is legal in the abstract to a
consideration of anticipated consequences in the real world.47
47. Cf. THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT 193 (1935) (con-
demning practice of courts to declare laws "valid or invalid on the analogy of books
rather than on a present investigation of facts").
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Chevron moved the debate from a sterile, backward-looking conver-
sation about Congress' nebulous and fictive intent to a forward-
looking, instrumental dialogue about what future effects the pro-
posed policy is likely to have. Shifting the focus to questions like
which policy choice is actually likely to do a better job of cleaning
up the air is a progressive change. This question is ultimately more
important than courts imagining what some inexperienced con-
gressional staffer might or might not have intended when writing
legislative history.
The effect of Chevron on the internal dynamics of agency deci-
sion-making is significant and positive. Chevron is significant for re-
ducing the relative power of lawyers within EPA and other agencies
and for increasing the power of other professionals. At the mar-
gins, agency decisions after Chevron reflect more weight on policy
choices and less on legalistic interpretations.
III. A NORMATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON WHAT CHEVRON WROUGHT.
Before delving into a normative debate regarding Chevron's ef-
fects, it is important to briefly review the institutional changes Chev-
ron has wrought. From a historical perspective, one of the major
constitutional changes in American law in the 20th century is the
rise of administrative law-making as a dominant mode of legal deci-
sion-making. 48 Chevron is the culmination of a process of differenti-
ation in which agencies have come to be recognized as a part of the
Executive Branch. As such, it is increasingly recognized that agen-
cies no longer exercise law-making authority derivatively as the
mere "agent" of Congress, but they also exercise law-making author-
ity independently as part of the Executive Branch once a delegation
has been made.49
As argued above, Chevron fundamentally re-conceptualized the
nature of those statutes over which an agency has been given inter-
pretative rights, e.g., environmental statutes administered by EPA.
Chevron changed the pre-Chevron view that when Congress enacts
statutes, it prescriptively addresses every question that may arise to
the post-Chevron conceptualization that Congress rarely anticipates
every unanswered question, or at least rarely reaches the necessary
48. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., ET AL., LEGISLATION: CASES AND MATERIALS
ON STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC PoLIcY 742 (3d ed. 2001) (explaining
rise in judicial use of textual canons of statutory construction in place of other
canons).
49. See generally Emily S. McMahon, Chadha and the Non-Delegation Doctrine: De-
fining a Restricted Legislative Veto, 94 YALE L.J. 1493, 1494-95 (1985) (noting increas-
ing shift of policy-making authority from Congress to Executive Branch).
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consensus of a majority in both houses on an "intent" with regard
to every question. Because of Chevron, agencies now hold interpre-
tive rights over those unanswered questions.
Within this realm of discretion, it is neither a legislative nor
judicial function, but rather an executive function for an agency,
acting under presidential supervision, to answer statutory questions
left open by Congress. The "answer" that an agency chooses will
reflect the agency's policy choices; as supervised by the White
House. This is a major shift of power to the Executive Branch and
away from congressional staff and lower federal courts.
One result of this Chevron induced shift of power to agencies
within the Executive Branch, as mentioned earlier, is that agency
experts are making more policy decisions rather than agency law-
yers and federal courts. Thus, Chevron represents a culmination of
the vision articulated by the first generation of administrative law-
yers in the 1930s that "expertise" would play a greater role than
"legalism" in our law. For example, James Landis, the intellectual
father of administrative agencies in the 1930s, wrote " [t] he adminis-
trative process is, in essence, our generation's answer to the inade-
quacy of the judicial and legislative processes."5 0 Landis and his
colleagues argued that the common law tends to become a closed
system that is not sufficiently receptive to information from other
disciplines. They argued for 21 system in which technical knowledge
and expertise from disciplines in addition to law would play a larger
role in shaping public policy. In the words of Landis' Harvard con-
temporary, Felix Frankfurter, the role of expertise would be to ex-
pand "the area of accredited knowledge as the basis of action" in
the "intricate and technical facts" of a complex modem society.5'
In a remarkable passage that foreshadowed by 50 years what later
became the Chevron doctrine, Landis even argued that "questions of
law" for courts should be limited to those questions on which law-
yers have particular expertise:
Our desire to have courts determine questions of law is related to a
belief in their possession of expertness in regard to such questions.'
It is from that very desire that the nature of questions of law
emerges. For, in the last analysis, they seem to me to be those ques-
tions that lawyers are equipped to decide.52
50. JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 46 (1938).
51. FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE PUBLIC AND ITS GOVERNMENT 151-52 (1930).
52. Landis, supra note 50, at 152 (original italics).
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In a sense, then, Chevron represents the culmination of the vision
articulated by Landis and his colleagues in the 1930s that expertise
would play a larger role in public policy.
The word expertise has subtly changed its connotation since the
1930s. What Landis and his generation meant is not necessarily
people in white coats who know a lot about statistics, but rather
people who work in a particular area and know it by experience 53
or what we might call today "specialists." The word in German for
what Landis meant is sachverstdndige, which literally means "a per-
son who understands the thing."
Normatively, I don't believe that only "people who understand
the thing," experts, should make the rules.54 As Judge Weinstein
said to me one time when I spoke with him about the increased
emphasis on expertise in German law, "Don, don't you realize
that's what the struggle against authoritarianism in World War II
was all about?" He had a valid point. There must be a balance
between democratic policy-making and politics on the one hand,
and expertise on the other. It is possible to imagine a hypothetical
legal system where experts have too much power and authority. My
mentor, Judge David Bazelon, was concerned that we might end up
with too much expertise in the law and be governed by un-elected
experts. 55 Although things might have worked out that way, they
have not thus far. At least in environmental law, there is little dan-
ger that experts have too much power in administrative agencies.
Rather, the pressing problem today is that EPA responds too much
to politics and not enough to the technical expertise of the pro-
gram offices. 56
The challenge, in my view, is how to inject more expertise into
policy-making or how to receive more input from the sachver-
stdndige. As another Bazelon clerk, Steve Goldberg, a Professor at
Georgetown University Law School observed, "[r]egulatory agen-
cies are regularly accused of being 'captured' by industry, consumer
53. Cf FED. R. EVID. 702 (permitting expert testimony on matters involving
"scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge... [by] a witness qualified... by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education") (emphasis added).
54. E. Donald Elliott, Strengthening Science's Voice at EPA, 66 LAw & CoNrEmp.
PROBS. 45, 48 (Autumn, 2003). "While I favor strengthening science's voice in EPA
decisions, I am not an imperialist for science. I do not believe that science alone
should determine policy, nor that regulation should always wait until science is
clear." Id.
55. See, e.g., David L. Bazelon, Coping With Technology Through the Legal Process,
62 CORNELL L. REv. 817, 820 (1977) (explaining "the perils of wizardry," or threat
that expertise might dominate our public decision-making).
56. See Elliott, supra note 54, at 45, 48; E. Donald Elliott et al., Science, Agencies,
and the Courts: Is Three a Crowd?, 31 ENvrL. L. REP. 10,125 (January 2001).
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groups, members of Congress, or bureaucratic inertia. They are
never accused, however, of being captured by scientists."57 Al-
though there are potential problems with too much expert policy-
making, there is little concern at this time that scientists are going
to take over the world and push out the politicians.
The ultimate effect of Chevron, in my opinion, has been to give
somewhat more weight to expertise, both inside agencies and in the
legal system as a whole. Because of Chevron, air policy can now be
made more by air policy experts in EPA's air program office and
less by the lawyers in OGC or the staffers in Congress, neither of
whom have as much expertise as the career experts in the program
offices. In general, I contend this is a good thing.
Of course, good policy requires an amalgam of disciplines.
Both agency lawyers and congressional staffers have valid perspec-
tives that should be taken into account. Although their views and
contributions should not be excluded, neither should the views of
those with specialized policy experience and expertise. At the mar-
gins, Chevron broadens and enriches the policy dialogue within
agencies by shedding the legal formalism that had previously domi-
nated agencies.
Why is that a good thing? Principally, it is a good thing be-
cause an increased input by experts into the policy-making process
at the margins is likely to result in better policy. Few would argue
that an ambient air quality standard grounded more in solid sci-
ence and less on administrative guesswork is a bad thing.
The increased role of expertise in agency decision-making that
Chevron spawned has had an additional, normatively positive impact
on administrative law; it has arguably increased the democratic le-
gitimacy of the administrative state because it has led to less reli-
ance on equivocal legislative history and more on the science-based
determinations that Congress authorized agencies to make. 58 The
57. Steven Goldberg, The Reluctant Embrace: Law and Science in America, 75
GEO. L.J. 1341, 1365-66 (1987).
58. See generally JERRY L. MASHAw, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING
PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 152-53 (1997). "Strangely enough, it may
make sense to imagine the delegation of political authority to administrators as a
device for improving the responsiveness of government to the desires of the gen-
eral electorate." Id. Chevron's arguable improvement on the democratic process is
evident in the Chevron Step One analysis; Justice Stevens required a classic textual
inquiry into a statute's ambiguous language. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-45. If no
clear outcome can be reached from a statute's text, that is, "Congress has not spo-
ken to the issue," then a reviewing court should defer to the agency's interpreta-
tion; it should not delve into legislative history and pick a statement on the
legislative record that supports the particular judge's policy preferences on how to
resolve a statutory ambiguity. Id. Because Congress delegates to agencies the au-
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central insight underlying the Chevron decision is that Congress is a
collective body, not a single human mind. Under our Constitution,
Congress can make binding law only when a measure is passed by
two houses and is subject to veto by the President. Floor statements
by individual members of Congress, or committee report language,
do not create binding law. Therefore, Chevron recognized the nor-
mative proposition that statutory interpreters should give floor
statements less weight, especially in the context of an agency using
its expertise to interpret an ambiguity in its governing statute.
As such, Chevron was part of a broader movement in separation
of powers law, along with Chadha,59 the legislative veto case, and
more importantly perhaps, Brock v. Pierce County ("Brock"). 60 In
Brock, the Supreme Court declared that statements by individual
legislators are entitled to some weight but they are not binding. 61
Thus, the Supreme Court has itself recognized that the statement
of an individual legislator on the Congressional Record is not the
equivalent in juridical authority to a statute.
The problems of so-called designer legislative history have
been well documented in the environmental area.62 For example,
when Congress passed the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, there
were 50 pages of legislative history inserted into the Congressional
Record. The statements made in that legislative history were never
actually made on the House or Senate floor. Nor did anyone have a
chance to respond to or question the legislative history. Yet, be-
cause it had been inserted into the Congressional Record, it was ar-
gued that the legislative history constituted binding congressional
intent, which courts were required to enforce. This is precisely one
of the evils at which Chevron took aim.
thority to make legislative rules to effectively execute a statute, not the judiciary,
the democratic process is better served when a court defers to an agency's inter-
pretation of a statutory ambiguity, rather than make up its own.
59. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 956-59 (emphasizing bicameral limitations on con-
gressional legislation and separation of powers).
60. 476 U.S. 253, 263 (1986) (suggesting that floor statements should be con-
sidered but are not controlling, thereby giving less importance to notion that there
is such thing as legislative intent that must be adhered to).
61. See id. (stating that floor statements by Congress were evidence of statu-
tory meaning, but did not bind courts interpreting statute).
62. See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN & WiLLIAM HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DRTY AIR:
OR How THE CLEAN AIR ACT BECAME A MULTIBILLION-DOLLAR BAIL-OUT FOR HIGH-
SULFUR COAL PROCEDURES AND WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT IT (1981) (discuss-
ing problems that arise when Congress inserts post hoc statements in Congres-
sional Record, which may illegitimately skew judicial interpretation of
environmental statutes).
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Prior to Chevron, the law rested on a loose and imprecise meta-
phor that analogized statutes to narrative texts created by a single
human author and assumed that a coherent and consistent "intent"
existed for each action taken by Congress. Chevron proceeds from a
much more realistic premise about Congressional action, namely,
that most of a statute is ridden with gaps and ambiguities. Most of a
statute is empty. Most of the questions that come up later are not
questions that Congress thought about. They are not questions on
which there was the necessary majority consensus in both the
House and Senate, subject to a possible Presidential veto. Most of
the issues that arise subsequently need to be decided in the first
instance by someone, but it is pure legal fiction to assert that Con-
gress had already decided them previously. When a court says it is
"enforcing congressional intent" based on a statement by an indi-
vidual staff member written into legislative history, the court's au-
thority is dubious at best as a matter of democratic theory. Rather,
the court is probably making the decision itself, then arguing as a
legitimating legal fiction that it is required to make the decision by
legislative history or narrative consistency. As a matter of demo-
cratic legitimacy, it is usually better that an agency with the relevant
expertise make the decision under the very active policy supervision
of the press and the elected President, as represented by the Office
of Management and Budget policy review process.
In conclusion, Chevron is a healthy development. It is a signifi-
cant mid-course correction in the life and development of adminis-
trative agencies. Chevron is a positive development because at the
margins, the Chevron doctrine gives agencies greater authority to
make policy and also empowers experts in the program offices
within agencies to have a larger role in deciding policy. Norma-
tively, I contend that the increased role of expertise in administra-
tive decision-making, in addition to the interpretation of complex
environmental statutes, is preferable to the covert judicial policy-
making that occurs when agencies are not given a seat at the statu-
tory interpretation table.
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